This paper addresses a national security issue with broad and important implications. It documents the pervasiveness of the myth that “civilian” micromanagement of field operations has been a major factor in the failure or shortcomings of major military operations from Vietnam to the present. It then demolishes that myth, correctly pointing out that failures have generally come from inadequate clarity of mission, strategic incoherence, and toleration of conflicting policies by subordinates rather than from Presidential control of tactical decisions. Author Dr. Lamb points out that senior military officers inflict more instances of unproductive micromanagement on their subordinates than the President and Secretary of Defense. Having discredited the myth, Dr. Lamb goes on to provide useful advice for high-ranking military officers to establish mutually respectful and productive relations with their appointed and elected superiors, to institute oversight mechanisms to ensure the mission of the operation is succeeding, and to intervene when it is not. – Excerpt from book.
Foreword vii
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 3
Part I: The Historical Record 4
Historical Observations 24
Part II: Leadership, Micromanagement, and Mission Command 25
Recommendations 34
Conclusion 37
Notes 39
About the Author 59
US military officials within the chain of command, Congressional and defense contractors serving as military hardware and software providers
Product Details
- Christopher J. Lamb
- Strategic
- Military Operations
- Myth and Mission Command
- Leadership