Saddam's War: An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War (ePub eBook)

When lessons learned from the major combat operations phase of operation Iraqi Freedom were briefed to the nation’s top leaders, the question was asked:

“How did events leading to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime look from the Iraqi  perspective?” That question was posed to the Joint advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for defense analyses (IDA), triggering the Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP), a research effort sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces command that has delivered several volumes of analysis and supporting materials, with more in production.

The IPP is reminiscent of an effort begun in 1946, when a team of U.S. army historians and intelligence officers established a relationship with former members of the German general staff to develop an understanding of familiar events from an unfamiliar point of view. This volume marks the extension of that same methodology under a different sponsor, the National Intelligence Council, to encompass a broader spectrum of Middle Eastern military history from the perspective of Lieutenant General Ra’ad Hamdani, who during operation Iraqi Freedom commanded Saddam Hussein’s II Republican Guard Corps.

Interviewed over a number of days by project leader Kevin Woods and historian Williamson “Wick” Murray, General Hamdani shared his knowledge about a wide range of subjects, with particular emphasis on his experiences in Iraq’s long war against Iran.

The project’s objective was to produce a series of personal, organizational, and campaign histories of contemporary Iraq. This volume is the first in that series, provided with the hope that it will improve our understanding of Middle Eastern military thought, the new Iraqi military, neighboring countries, and the dynamics of a region of the world that is vital to U.S. interests.

Topics of the discussions themselves ranged from the immediate tactical outcomes of particular actions in the Iran-Iraq War, to the interplay between the requirements of tyrannies (religious as well as secular) to control their political future, to the demands of military organizations for professionally competent officers who understand tactics and operations and who are able and willing to provide honest judgments of what is happening or might happen on the battlefield. In that respect, Ayatollah Rhollah Khomeini’s Iran and Saddam’s Iraq exhibited considerable similarities, although Saddam at times proved a faster learner—at least over the course of his war against Iran. On the opposite side, Khomeini and his fellow religious leaders appear to have clung, right through to the conflict’s end, to their belief that religious fanaticism and revolutionary spirit would triumph over all.

Table of Contents:
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Summary and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Arab-Israeli Wars and the rise of the Ba’ath Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Between the 1973 War and the

Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Thoughts on the Iran-Iraq “cold-War” in the 1990s . . . . . . 17

Comments on Saddam Hussein as Political and Military leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Discussion One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973 • Military transition under Ba’athist rule

Discussion Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Iraqi Military and Political transition through the 1970s • Prologue to Iran-Iraq War •

transition of Iranian leadership and Military • decision to Invade  •

Saddam’s aspirations • earliest Phase of the War • Political and Professional

soldiers • disorganized command and control of Iranian operations

Discussion Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Early Use of Air Power • SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] • Winter 1980–1981

Iraqi command changes • Saddam’s response to failure and executions •

1980–1982 losses and army expansions • developments of Iranian and Iraqi

Forces

Discussion Four . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Saddam’s Psychology and Personality development • January 1981 Armor

Battle • Iranian human Wave tactics and Iraqi Minefields • Khomeini’s spiritual Influence • Battles of Abadan and Khorramshahr • loss of special forces • end of Initial Iraqi offensives in May 1981

Discussion Five . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

1981–1982 turbulence in Tehran • Iranian Infiltration tactics • 1982 attacks

around Basra • 1984–1988 Marsh Infiltrations and Iraqi engineering efforts

• International support to Iran • chemical Weapons usage • Iranian response to Weapons of Mass Destruction • Postwar Preparations with WMD  • 1982–1983 reorganization and recruiting for Republican Guard • Psychological support of Saddam to troops • Postwar Republican Guard reorganization

Discussion Six . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Summer 1983 Iranian offensive into Haj Umran • northern Mountain operations and Kurdish support •

a 1,000-kilometer front • threats to the dams  and Baghdad • unpredictable Iranian strategy and tactics • February 1984 Iraqi 6th armored division losses • Iranian Marsh operations • Intelligence Development and satellite support in March 1985

Discussion Seven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

1986 Al-Fao Campaign and Baghdad’s Misinterpretation of Iranian Strategy •  traitors in the Iraqi leadership • Prisoners of War• operation Dawn •Iraqi casualty competition and the “Bedouin Mentality”

Discussion Eight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Republican Guard expansion and the response to Al-Fao •Hussein Kamel • General Hamdani’s command obstacles • 1987 Iranian attack on Basra and

casualty Inflation • Shalamjah: the Somme of the Iran-Iraq War • Hamdani’s venture through the front and the Battlefield conditions

Discussion Nine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

July 1987 Republican Guard command changes • Battlefield Missiles • Halabjah •factors of Post-1987 shift in “correlation of forces” toward Iraq— Planning effort for Al-fao offensive • use of helicopters •

front of 1988 • July 1988 Iraqi Incursion through to Ahvaz and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq

Discussion Ten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Foundations of the Iraqi Military and Saddam’s detrimental Influence • Hamdani’s effort to Improve Iraqi Military culture • Questioning Military orders  and Planning • lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq War • fight to follow the  War and Saddam’s Perception of victory and Warfare

Discussion Eleven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Stories of War heroes, 1973 to operation Iraqi Freedom • Saddam’s Misunderstanding of Warfare •

Hamdani’s recognition of U.S. strategy in 2003 • understanding one’s enemy

Discussion Twelve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

1990s Military Planning against Iran • historical explanation of Iran-Iraq conflict • religious and ethnic elements • economic and regional aspects  (Persian Gulf) • Shatt al-Arab • Ideology, Ba’athism, and Khomeini • Present conflict and Iranian and al Qaeda Influence

Discussion Thirteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Planning for an Iranian adversary • Iranian structure • 2003 and Iranian strategy • Ayatollah as executive • Iranian Military development and capabilities • Missiles • Iranian threat to Iraq and Infiltration • Internal agents •Iraqi counterinfiltration • Iranian Militias • Iraqi Military developments

since 1991 • cooptation of tribes

Discussion Fourteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Role of religion in Iran-Iraq conflict • hypothetical Iraqi offensive against Iran and Phases of  Preparations • Iranian Influence in Iraq • Arabistan • Baluchs and Kurds • air and Missile strikes and Military-Industrial complex • younger Iranian generation • smart Weapons and satellites • terrain •

operational objectives • Iranian lessons learned • Iranian Missile deterrent

Discussion Fifteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Armor operations • Bravery and the Warrior Mentality • Saddam’s Misunderstanding of Military technology • Integration of helicopter and tank capabilities • lessons learned on artillery, Iraq, and Iran • changes in Iranian command and control • Iranian tactical and operational developments

Discussion Sixteen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Recommendations for U.S. actions in Iraq from May 2007

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Index to themes in the discussions . . . . . . . . . . 14

Policymakers, members of government and military-focused committees, members of the military (active and reserve), military analysts and tacticians, the Department of Defense, staff of defense agencies and defense contractors, the intelligence community, and members of academia involved in warfare studies/Middle Eastern studies/foreign policy would be interested in this publication. In addition, Veterans and military enthusiasts from the general public would find this publication interesting.