Melvin Laird and the Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military, 1969-1973

Melvin Laird became President Richard Nixon’s secretary of defense in January 1969. His challenging agenda included two goals: withdrawing the U.S. military from Vietnam and reshaping U.S. the armed forces for the future. He worked toward ending the inequitable draft system and replacing it with an all-volunteer force of regulars supported by National Guard and Reserve components. Laird’s tenure was also marked by battles with Congress and the administration over the defense budget and the antiballistic military system as well as efforts to strengthen alliances with NATO, East Asian allies, and Israel.

Table of Contents
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgments

Chapter 1 Change Comes to the Pentagon 1
  A Reluctant and Independent Secretary 5
  A New Team 9
  Systems Analysis and International Security Affairs 15
  Acquisition Reform 20
  Blue Ribbon Defense Panel 21

Chapter 2 Organizing National Security in a New Administration 31
  Nixonian Approach 31
  An EC–121 Goes Down 37
  Defense Program Review Committee 45
  Trying to Fix Intelligence 51
  Private Channels 57

Chapter 3 How Much for Defense: The FY 1970 Budget 61
  Laird’s Inheritance 61
  Economic and Political Realities 63
  Pay Reform 67
  DoD Budget Review 69
  Differences with the White House 71
  More Defense Cuts 76
  Congress Enters the Fray 80

Chapter 4 The Predicament of Vietnam 89
  The Nixon Administration’s Opening Moves 93
  Laird Goes to Vietnam 98
  Vietnamization 103
  The Midway Conference and Troop Withdrawals 109
  Improvement and Modernization Plans 115
  Vietnamization Triumphant 117
  The Military Option: Duck Hook 119

Chapter 5 The Battle over Troop Withdrawals 125
  Cost and Pace of Withdrawals 127
  The Fourth Tranche 131

Chapter 6 Taking the Fight into Cambodia 143
  Pursuing Military Option 144
  Striking the Sanctuaries 152

Chapter 7 The War in Laos 165
  The Administration Takes on Laos 166
  Origin of Lam Son 719 175
  Operation Lam Son 719 183

Chapter 8 Preparing South Vietnam to Stand Alone 199
  Troop Withdrawals: How Fast? 199
  A Growing South Vietnamese Force, 1970–1971 203
  Improvement and Modernization 205
  Planning for the Enemy Threat 208
  North Vietnam Prepares for an Offensive 213

Chapter 9 A Time of Trial: The Easter Offensive and Vietnamization 221
  The Invasion Begins 223
  Command and Leadership 225
  The Offensive Intensifies 229
  Augmenting U.S. Power 234
  Striking North Vietnam 239

Chapter 10 Looking Beyond Vietnam: The FY 1971 Budget 251
  A New Budget Process 251
  Major Program Memoranda 253
  NSSM 3: Rethinking the Budget and National Strategy 257
  The White House and DoD Hammer Out a Budget 259
  Laird Testifies 267
  House Hearings 269
  Congress Decides 273

Chapter 11 A Turning Point: The FY 1972 Budget 279
  Fiscal Guidance 280
  Battling the Defense Program Review Committee 282
  Laird Confronts Congress 291
  Congress Decides 300

Chapter 12 The Enduring Commitment to NATO 305
  Deep-Seated Troubles 306
  Conventional Forces: A Credible Deterrent? 310
  Nuclear Weapons 311
  Developing NATO Policy 313
  Budget Constraints 315
  The Battle over U.S. Forces in NATO 321
  Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 324

Chapter 13 Change in East Asia 329
Policy Review 330
An Assertive Japan 331
The Odyssey of Chemical Weapons 336
The Reversion Agreement 343
South Korea 347
NSSM 27: Shaping a New Policy 349
Reopening the Door to China 355

Chapter 14 The All-Volunteer Force 363
  Draft Reform and Vietnam 364
  A New Administration Acts 366
  Project Volunteer 367
  Seeking Fairness: The Draft Lottery 371
  Toward Consensus 374
  Executing the Decision 382

Chapter 15 Strategic Defense: ABM and SALT 395
  Evolution of Ballistic Missile Defense 396
  Nixon Reviews the ABM 397
  Battle for the ABM 403
  Strategic Arms Limitations 408
  Battle for Phase II 413
  Toward an Arms Agreement 418
  Laird to the Fore 420

Chapter 16 Realistic Deterrence? The FY 1973 Budget 433
  Round One: Strategic Guidance 434
  Fiscal Guidance 438
  White House Review 440
  President’s Budget Request 448
  Congressional Review 451
  Gains and Losses 458

Chapter 17 Military Assistance 463
  Congressional Critics 464
  Battle over the FY 1971 MAP 468
  Congress Rebels 472
  The Case of Israel 477
  The Crisis Deepens 483
  Impasse 487

Chapter 18 Looking toward the Future: The FY 1974 Budget 493
  Debate over Guidance 494
  Summer Stalemate 501
  President’s Budget 509

Chapter 19 Fixing the Fraying Force 515
  Who Fights in Vietnam 517
  Drug Abuse 518
  Racial Discord 524
  New Opportunities for Women 536
 
Chapter 20 Laird’s Legacy 543

Abbreviations
Notes
Note on Sources and Selected Bibliography
Index

Charts and Maps

Defense Department, 1968 4
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Proposal
for DoD Reorganization  25
VC Base Areas 154
Lam Son 719 185
Easter Offensive 222

Tables

1. Johnson’s DoD Budget Proposal, FY 1970

2. Personnel Strengths for End of FY 1970

3. New Obligational Authority (NOA), FY 1970

4. Outlays, FY 1970

5. Menu Sorties

6. South Vietnamese Force Structure

7. USAF Aircraft in Southeast Asia, 1972

8. U.S. Navy Forces in Southeast Asia, 1972

9. NSSM 3 Alternative Strategies

10. DoD Budget Estimate, FY 1971

11. Estimated Active-Duty Military Personnel for End of FY 1971

12. Ready and Standby Reserves

13. Defense Appropriations FY, 1971 (NOA)

14. New Obligational Authority, FY 1972

15. Requested Outlays by Program, FY 1972

16.  Budget Request, FY 1972

17. General Purpose Forces

18. Congressional Action (NOA) on Defense Budget

19. Military Personnel

20. Appropriations for Weapon Systems, FY 1972

21. President’s DoD Budget Request, FY 1973

22. Budget NOA Request with Modifications Compared with Appropriations (July–October 1972)

23. Military Strength and Personnel Appropriations, FY 1973

24. Executive Branch MAP and FMS Requests, FYs 1969–1973

25. Total Obligational Authority, FY 1974

26. Outlays, FY 1974

27. Active Military Personnel and Forces, FYs 1973–1974

This book may appeal to the U.S. Department of Defense personnel, other government officials, and policymakers in the national security community, and members of Congress. Additionally, historians, Vietnam War veterans, and academia may be interested in this primary source work.