The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Operation Just Cause, December 1989-January 1990 (Paperback)

U.S. Invasion of Panama Controversial Yet "Just" to Remove a Corrupt Government Rule of President Manuel Noriega

On December 20, 1989, the United States broke both international law and its own government policies by invading Panama in order to bring its President Manuel Noriega to justice for drug trafficking.

Noriega had seized control of his country back in 1983 when he became head of the National Guard. From this position of power, he was able to build up the military and manipulate elections so that the winning presidents would be his puppet leaders.

Corruption was widespread during Noriega's rule, and he was able to use his power to imprison and sometimes kill any who opposed him. In 1987 a former officer of the Panamanian defense force publicly accused Noriega of cooperating with Colombian drug producers.

The US responded by imposing strict sanctions that took an extensive toll on the country. On December 15, 1989, the Panamanian legislature declared Noriega president and that the US and Panama were in a state of war. Following the shooting of a U.S. Marine, President George Bush ordered Operation Just Cause, an invasion consisting of over 25,000 soldiers. The mission was controversial due to the resulting loss of hundreds of Panamanian lives and the subsequent damage to Panama City and El Chorillo.

The military was able to quickly achieve its goals as Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990. He was taken to the US, tried, convicted and jailed on drug trafficking charges and is currently serving his 40-year sentence in Miami.

Table of Contents:

Foreword .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

The Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Chapter

 1. The Panama Crisis, June 1987–December 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 Origins of the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

 The Southern Command Reacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

 Routine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

 Operation Nimrod Dancer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 The Road to Just Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 2. Preparations and Adjustments, 17–19 December 1989 . . . . . . . . . . 37

 Sunday, 17 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

 Monday, 18 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

 The Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

 Tuesday, 19 December . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

 3. Special Operations at the Outset of Just Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

 Regime Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

 Task Force White: The Canal, Balboa Harbor, and Paitilla

 Airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

 The Rescue of Kurt Muse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

 4. Task Force Gator and the Comandancia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

 Plans and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

 The Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

 5. Task Force Semper Fi and Task Force Black Devil . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

 Task Force Semper Fi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

 Task Force Black Devil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

 6. Task Force Wildcat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

 Preparations and Initial Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

 Team Track and Company C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

 Company A, 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

 Company B, 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

 7. Task Force Black and Task Force Red-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

 Task Force Black . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

 Task Force Red-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

8. The 82d Airborne Division on D-day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

 Planning and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

 Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

 On the Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

 The Air Assaults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

 9. Task Force Red-R at Rio Hato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

 Plans, Preparations, and Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

 The Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

10. Task Force Atlantic: D-day in Area of Operations North . . . . . . . 301

 Perceptions, Planning, and Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302

 Coco Solo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311

 Fort Espinar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322

 The Colón Bottleneck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328

11. Task Force Atlantic: D-day in Area of Operations South . . . . . . . 331

 Preparations, Deployment, and Prewar Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

 Madden Dam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343

 Cerro Tigre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346

 Gamboa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

 Renacer Prison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352

12. Loose Ends, 20 December 1989–3 January 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

 Hostages at the Marriott Hotel and Elsewhere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

 The Move into Colón . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

 Counterattack at the DNTT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378

 Ma Bell and Other Operations Outside the Canal Area . . . . . . . . 384

 Apprehending the Dictator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393

13. The Transition to Stability Operations and Nation Building,

 December 1989–January 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403

 From Blind Logic to Promote Liberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405

 The Transition in the Field: The Troops and the People . . . . . . . . 415

 Panama City: From Ordered Chaos to the Military

 Support Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441

14. Follow-Through and Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455

 A Busy Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455

 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495

Tables

Charts

Maps

Illustrations

The Panama crisis and its military resolution are integral parts of America’s military heritage.  The difficult planning that went into Operation Just Cause should be studied by current military strategists and officers, policymakers, and members of government in order to understand the kinds of military strategies and planning that may be needed for future missions of similar complexity.