
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.
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Table of Contents:
Executive Summary p. viii
Chapter 1
Introduction p. 1
Why Policy Makers Should Care about Security Sector Assistance p. 3
The Complexities of the U.S. Security Sector Assistance Framework p. 5
Chapter 2
2001-2003: Building the Foundations for the Afghan National Security Forces p. 11
Early U.S. Efforts Did Not Include Security Force Development p. 11
The Afghan Scrimmage for Power p. 12
Lead Nation Silos: International Commitment to Security Sector Reform p. 14
Afghan National Army p. 15
Afghan National Police p. 26
Transitional Forces and Eroding Security p. 33
Chapter 3
2004-2008: Rapid Expansion of the Force to Address Growing Insecurity p. 35
Reconstitution of the Taliban p. 35
Erosion of Local Support p. 36
United States Takes Ownership of Army and Police Development p. 37
Afghan National Army p. 38
Afghan National Police p. 55
Chapter 4
2009-2014: U.S. Surge and Transition p. 69
U.S. Strategic Review p. 69
Transition Security to Afghan Lead p. 71
Afghan National Army p. 76
Afghan National Police p. 93
Chapter 5
2015-2016: Train, Advise, and Assist p. 107
Conditions Not Set, Afghans Face Resilient Insurgency p. 107
U.S. Leadership Struggles to Stabilize Mission Scope p. 108
Resolute Support and Operation Freedom’s Sentinel p. 109
Afghan National Army p. 111
Afghan National Police p. 120
Chapter 6
Cross-Cutting Issues Affecting ANDSF Development p. 131
Corruption and Conditionality p. 131
Literacy Training: Building a Sustainable, Independent ANDSF p. 142
Women in the ANDSF p. 148
ANDSF Equipment and Weapons p. 153
Attrition in the ANDSF p. 156
Rotational Training p. 160
Chapter 7
Key Findings and Conclusions p. 165
Chapter 8
Lessons p. 175
Chapter 9
Recommendations p. 181
Appendices and Endnotes p. 199
Appendix A: Methodology p. 199
Appendix B: Summary of Relevant Audits and Inspections p. 202
Appendix C: Abbreviations p. 215
Endnotes p. 217
Selected Bibliography p. 247
Acknowledgments p. 259
This publication provides independent and objective leadership and recommendations to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and inform Congress, and the Secretaries of State and Defense about reconstruction-related problems in Afghanistan and the need for corrective action.
Product Details
- Sopko, John F.
- SIGAR 17 62 LL
- Afghanistan
- SIGAR, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
- Lessons From the United States Experience in Afghanistan