Reform And Experimentation After The Cold-War 1989-2001

Reform And Experimentation After The Cold-War 1989-2001
Title:
Reform And Experimentation After The Cold-War 1989-2001
Format:
Hardcover
USA Price: 
Stock:
In stock
GPO Stock Number:
008-000-01387-0
Description

Reform and Experimentation after the Cold War, 1989–2001, captures the history of acquisition during a fertile period for initiatives aimed at enabling the Defense Department to become better at supporting the development and production of new weapon systems. In a context of restrained budgets and optimism for a future free of superpower conflict, defense leaders implemented reforms and experimented with new methods designed to sidestep the hurdles that often led to unacceptable cost increases and schedule delays. The increasing consolidation of responsibility for acquisition oversight and policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, combined with pressure from Congress and elsewhere to fully implement the Packard Commission and Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the mid-1980s, gave defense leaders the motivation and influence to carry out several waves of reform over the 12 years of this wide-ranging study. As the authors deftly show, those reforms and experiments met with mixed success.

Table of Contents

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS   ix

FOREWORD xi

PREFACE   xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xix

I. THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER IN FLUX: FROM THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL TO THE 9/11 ATTACKS   1

America’s Search for a Post–Cold War Strategy   2

Structuring the Post–Cold War Force   7

Technology and the Search for New Methods of Warfare 14

1989–1990   23

The Quest for Acquisition Reform 23

The Management Review and Report   32

Implementing the Report   37

III. THE FAILURE OF OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT:

THE A–12 PROGRAM   53

The New Acquisition Czar   53

The A–12 Fiasco   59

Lessons of the A–12   66

Disciplining the System   71

IV. THE V–22 OSPREY AND THE POLITICS OF THE DEFENSE

DRAWDOWN, 1989–1992   85

The Peace Dividend   85

The Fight for the Osprey: Strategy and Tactics 94

The Fight for the Osprey: Cat and Mouse   102

The Fight for the Osprey: Showdown   107

V. ACQUISITION UNDER STRESS: ADAPTING TO WAR

AND RETHINKING REFORM, 1990–1993   121

Acquisition for the Persian Gulf War 121

Progress Without Production   131

vi Contents

The “New Approach” to Acquisition 134

Rethinking Acquisition Reform   141

VI. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS, AND ACQUISITION REFORM, 1993–1997 155

Pentagon Acquisition Leadership and Reform Agenda 155

Integrating the Defense and Civilian Industrial Bases 161

Reinventing Government   164

Congress and Reform   168

VII. REFORMERS “REENGINEER” ACQUISITION, 1993–1997   179

Business Process Reengineering 179

Organizing for Acquisition Reform   181

Planning Acquisition Reform: Process Action Teams 184

Changing “How We Buy”: Integrated Product Teams

and Integrated Product and Process Development   186

Changing “What We Buy”: Military Specifications and Standards Reform   190

Defense Acquisition Pilot Program   193

The Search for Reform Metrics 194

The JDAM Pilot Program   196

Acquisition Reform Through Clinton’s First Term   199

VIII. THE TECHNOLOGY IMPERATIVE   211

The Problem of Technology Transition   212

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations   215

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ACTDs   223

JAST and the Origins of the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter 233

IX. ACQUISITION AND THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION   251

Defense Department Oversight of Computer Acquisition   252

Difficulties in Hardware and Software Development   262

Command and Control Systems: Requirements   274

Command and Control Systems: Interoperability   281

Simulation-Based Acquisition   284

X. ACQUISITION REFORM, 1997–2001 299

The Fiscal Context of Reform   299

The New Team: Organization and Priorities   303

Reduction of Total Ownership Costs   310

The Section 912 Studies   315

The Rise of Alternative Acquisition Approaches   319

Evolutionary Acquisition Becomes Policy   328

XI. THE AIR FORCE AND ACQUISITION, 1989–2001 

Acquisition Organization and Management   345

Darleen Druyun and Acquisition Reform   358

The C–17 Globemaster III: A Troubled Program Reverses Course   367

Contents vii

XII. THE ARMY AND ACQUISITION, 1989–2001 391

Organizing for Acquisition   391

Matrix Management   396

Acquisition Reform Organization and Training   399

MILSPEC Reduction and Teaming   402

Continuous Modernization   406

Modernizing Armor   411

“Changing The Way We Change,” Force XXI,

and the Digitized Battlefield   414

Force XXI Battlefield Command, Brigade and Below   420

Crusader: Acquisition in an Age of Army Transformation   422

XIII. ACQUISITION IN THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS, 1989–2001  441

Acquisition Organization   441

Reorganizing OPNAV: Integrating the Warfare Communities   447

A–12 Fallout Stimulates Reform: The F/A–18E/F Super Hornet Program   451

Navy Acquisition Reform Organization and Initiatives 456

Applying Acquisition Reforms to Aircraft, Ship, and Submarine Programs 459

The Arsenal Ship   468

Acquisition Reform’s Mixed Results 472

XIV. RESTRUCTURING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY, 1989–2001   491

Decline and Restructuring   491

The Battle Over Industrial Base Policy   497

The Promise and Peril of Dual-Use Technology 503

Merger Mania 510

XV. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE, 1989–2001 525

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act   525

Implementing DAWIA   529

The Workforce and Acquisition Reform   535

Defining and Downsizing the Acquisition Workforce   538

XVI. CONCLUSION   551

Audience

Senior military officials, foreign policy decision-makers, Congressional officials who are engaged in Department of Defense oversight, educators and students of U.S. military history, Veterans, and historians.

Product Details

Availability Details:
In Stock
USA Price:
$25.00
International Price:
$35.00
Weight:
3.9375
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Cover:
Cloth
Unit of Issue (US):
1
Unit of Issue (Non-US):
1
Record Creation Date:
11/01/2022
Last Status Update:
08/18/2023
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